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ABSTRACT: Health Coverage Tax Credits (HCTCs), which pay 65 percent of beneficiaries’ 
health insurance premiums, constitute an ambitious experiment in using the federal income tax 
system to subsidize health coverage for the uninsured. The HCTC program has made an excellent 
start, successfully developing program infrastructure and preventing the kind of marketing fraud 
that marred a previous tax credit program. However, the new program is experiencing low take-
up rates; there have been delays and confusion surrounding enrollment into the advance-payment 
option; and there is some dissatisfaction with coverage offered by participating health plans. To 
gather more evidence about HCTCs’ effectiveness and assess their prospects as a model for broader 
reforms, researchers visited Maryland, Michigan, and North Carolina, which used varied approaches 
to HCTC implementation. The authors present key findings and propose reforms to improve 
HCTCs’ ability to help its current target population and aid policymakers in designing future 
health insurance tax credits. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
When the Trade Act of 2002 became law, the nation began a major experiment in 
helping uninsured Americans purchase health coverage. This legislation created Health 
Coverage Tax Credits (HCTCs), which pay 65 percent of beneficiaries’ premiums for 
qualified coverage. Such coverage consists primarily of COBRA plans sponsored by 
former employers and private health plans offered to HCTC beneficiaries by state 
arrangement. The credits are refundable, which means they are paid in full to eligible 
households, including those who owe little or no federal income tax. The credits are also 
advanceable, which means that at the beneficiary’s request they can be paid directly to the 
insurer each month, as premiums are due. 
 
The HCTC program has made an excellent start establishing basic program 
infrastructure and preventing the kind of widespread fraud that was reported in 
connection with an earlier health insurance tax credit program. However, enrollment in 
the new tax credit has been low; consumers have experienced delays and confusion as a 
result of the complex enrollment process for advance payment; and there has been some 
dissatisfaction with the coverage offered by participating health plans. 
 
To gather evidence about the effectiveness of the new tax credits and to assess 
progress in finding solutions to emerging challenges, researchers from the Economic and 
Social Research Institute (ESRI) visited Maryland, Michigan, and North Carolina. In 
those states, enrollment of potentially eligible individuals into HCTC advance payment, 
though small in absolute terms (between 8 percent and 12 percent of potentially eligible 
individuals), was larger than the comparable national enrollment rate of 6.1 percent 
(representing 13,500 individuals of the nearly 222,000 who were potentially eligible for 
advance payment). Through these visits, the researchers sought to learn how three very 
different states, each using its own distinctive approach to implementation, achieved this 
comparative success. The authors also hoped that these visits would help identify obstacles 
that even the most effective state officials and private sector leaders face with the new 
program, as well as point the way toward possible solutions. 
 
Tables ES-1 and ES-2 on the next page show some of the salient characteristics of 
these three states, in terms of eligibility, enrollment, and the state-based plans that were 
offered to HCTC beneficiaries. 
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Table ES-1. Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC) Enrollment for Selected States, September 2004 
 
Maryland Michigan 
North 
Carolina 
Average of 
All Other States 
Percentage of potentially eligible workers enrolled in HCTC advance paymenta 11.5% 7.7% 9.5% 5.6%c 
Percentage of potentially eligible workers who qualified for HCTC based on 
payments from Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) or receipt of 
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)b 
90% PBGC 
10% TAA 
61% PBGC 
39% TAA 
36% PBGC
64% TAA 
69% PBGC 
31% TAA 
Percentage of advance-payment enrollees who chose state-qualified plans 46% 62% 61% 41%d 
 
 
Table ES-2. Health Plan Premiums and Cost-Sharing for HCTC Enrollees, June 2004 
 Maryland’s High-
Risk Poole 
Michigan’s Community-
Rated Coverage 
North Carolina’s 
Nongroup Plans 
Lowest deductible among offered plans $0 $250 $250 
Highest deductible (or other cost-sharing) among offered plans $1,000 50% co-insurance $5,000 
Basis for premium variation Age None 
Age, gender, health status, 
area of residence 
Lowest premium offered to 
25- to 55-year-olds 
$811 $1,292 $239f 
Beneficiaries’ annualized, 35% premium 
share for a one-person policy Highest premium offered to 
25- to 55-year-olds 
$2,557 $1,710 $5,847f 
a Percentages of potentially eligible workers enrolled in advance payment were calculated by dividing the number of advance payment enrollees, per state, into the total number of state households whom 
PBGC or a State Workforce Agency (SWA) identified as potentially eligible for HCTC and who were mailed outreach materials. These enrollment percentages do not include households claiming 
HCTCs only on their annual tax returns. 
b TAA-based eligibles include those who received TAA cash payments, qualified for such payments but for receipt of unemployment insurance, or received Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance 
income support provided to certain older, displaced workers. 
c Including the three case study states, the national percentage enrollment into advance payment was 6.1 percent of potentially eligible individuals (13,500 of 221,716 potentially eligible households). 
d The percentage of advance payment enrollees who chose state-qualified plans in all other states, as listed in this table, included only states in which at least one such plan (other than mini-COBRA 
coverage required of small employers under state law) was open to enrollees in September 2004. 
e Shortly before the site visit, Maryland also arranged to have a nongroup plan offered to HCTC beneficiaries. Only 7 HCTC beneficiaries were then enrolled in that plan, compared to roughly 500 
beneficiaries in the high-risk pool. 
f North Carolina premium quotes were for individuals living in the state capital, Raleigh. The person with the lowest premium was a 25-year-old male in the healthiest risk tier buying coverage with 
a $5,000 deductible. The person with the highest premium was a 25-year-old woman in the least healthy risk tier who bought coverage that included maternity care and that had a $250 deductible. 
The second-highest beneficiary premium share was $4,725, for a 55-year-old woman in the least healthy risk tier who enrolled in the plan with a $250 deductible.
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Following are some key findings from the three-state study: 
 
Public and private entities involved in state-level HCTC implementation 
were dedicated, creative, and effective. Gubernatorial leadership was critical in 
making HCTC implementation a top priority, with both public and private actors 
showing remarkable commitment to the program. In all three case study states, 
government officials worked together across traditional organizational boundaries to get 
HCTC-related systems up and running in remarkably brief periods of time. All three states 
likewise devised creative mechanisms to prevent beneficiaries from being required to pay 
premiums in full for several months before the start of advance payment. These 
mechanisms included so-called “bridge” or “gap filler” programs in North Carolina and 
Maryland that used National Emergency Grants (NEGs) from the U.S. Department of 
Labor (DOL) to subsidize beneficiaries’ premiums while they waited for their advance 
payment to start. 
 
Agencies involved in national HCTC implementation received generally 
positive reviews. In all three states, public and private stakeholders commended the 
responsive and nimble assistance they received from the Treasury Department, the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), and the private contractors working with the IRS. The leadership 
at DOL was viewed with more ambivalence. When unexpected problems emerged with 
advance payment, DOL received plaudits for creatively adjusting its policy on states’ 
permissible use of NEG dollars. However, concerns were expressed about DOL delays in 
ruling on specific state requests for NEG funds. 
 
Enrollment into advance payment was complex, which increased 
administrative costs and reduced take-up of the tax credit. To apply for HCTC, a 
displaced worker was required to make various applications to at least three different 
entities (the state workforce agency, the health plan, and the national HCTC office). To 
further complicate the application process, workers were responsible for passing 
documentation, in hard-copy form, back and forth between various entities to which they 
were applying. Privacy concerns often prevented federal officials, state officials, and health 
plans from sharing data or even speaking directly with one another about particular 
beneficiaries’ applications. As a result, beneficiaries frequently had to act as “go betweens” 
communicating technical matters between multiple public and private agencies; these 
efforts increased administrative costs, and when beneficiaries could not act as satisfactory 
intermediaries, many lost coverage. To their credit, the officials administering the national 
HCTC program have taken several promising steps in recent months to simplify the 
enrollment process, though more may need to be done. 
 x
Most informants agreed that the main reason why few beneficiaries 
enrolled in advance payment was workers’ perception that they could not 
afford to pay 35 percent of premiums. According to the vast majority of informants 
in the three study states, beneficiaries’ inability to pay their 35 percent premium share was 
by far the most important factor limiting enrollment. That problem was compounded by 
other obstacles to take-up, including delays in the start of individual beneficiaries’ advance 
payment and the general complexity and confusion of enrollment. 
 
Most enrollees preferred comprehensive coverage to less expensive 
insurance with high cost-sharing. In Maryland, 60 percent of beneficiaries enrolled in 
the high-risk pool’s more comprehensive HMO option, which had no deductible, rather 
than the PPO, which had a $1,000 deductible, even though the HMO cost roughly 50 
percent more. In Michigan, every beneficiary who enrolled in state-qualified coverage 
chose the more comprehensive plan, even though it cost 32 percent more than the plan 
with 50 percent coinsurance and no coverage of physician visits or preventive care. In 
North Carolina, 52 percent selected coverage with $250 or $500 deductibles, even though 
such coverage cost between 22 and 70 percent more than the highest-deductible plans. By 
contrast, a number of North Carolinians who selected higher-deductible plans to lower 
their premium costs later expressed strong dissatisfaction with that coverage. For example, 
some adults with chronic illnesses could not afford to refill their prescriptions, perceived 
their coverage as largely pointless, and eventually disenrolled. 
 
Health coverage with pure or modified community rating avoided some 
serious problems with nongroup coverage that based premium levels on 
individualized assessment of health status. In Michigan and Maryland, stakeholders 
expressed no dissatisfaction with those states’ rating rules for HCTC coverage. Michigan’s 
coverage was purely community rated, with all enrollees into a given plan charged the 
same premiums, regardless of age, gender, area of residence, or individual health history. 
Similarly, Maryland’s high-risk pool varied premiums based on age alone, without any 
medical underwriting (the process through which insurers assess each applicant’s individual 
health risk). 
 
On the other hand, North Carolina’s rating rules permitted premium variation 
based on factors that included age, gender, and medical underwriting. These variations 
created tremendous dissatisfaction, according to virtually every stakeholder interviewed. 
Beneficiaries, officials, and others typically found it unfair that HCTC’s state-qualified 
coverage was least affordable to those who needed it most, with premiums that varied 
dramatically based on factors outside the individual’s control. For example, premiums 
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could increase by 45 percent because of gender (for plans that excluded routine maternity 
care); by 179 percent for women who opted to include coverage for routine maternity 
care; by 211 percent because of age; by 253 percent because of individual health history 
and health status; and by more than 1,300 percent because of all these factors combined. 
 
Figure ES-1. Annualized 35 Percent Beneficiary Premium 
Share for Various Individuals Receiving Average State-
Based, One-Person Coverage in North Carolina, June 2004
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Premium share
 
 
Medical underwriting in North Carolina also had a dramatic effect on take-up. 
Among the displaced workers who were quoted higher premium rates after the 
underwriting process concluded, fully 69 percent dropped out of the program at that 
point. If these individuals had instead completed their enrollment into advance payment, 
more than 3,900 additional North Carolinians would have received coverage, increasing 
total, national HCTC enrollment by 42 percent. 
 
Some adverse selection and risk segmentation among plan options may 
have taken place. In Maryland’s high-risk pool, there appeared to be a stark difference 
between HCTC enrollees into the pool’s more generous HMO plan (which had no 
deductible) and the pool’s less expensive and less comprehensive PPO plan (which had a 
$1,000 deductible). Average per-member-per-month claims were $2,817 for HCTC 
beneficiaries in the former plan but only $433 in the latter. While additional data may be 
needed to come to a definitive conclusion, state officials were convinced that adverse 
selection had taken place, with HCTC beneficiaries who knew their health problems 
required more expensive care disproportionately tending to enroll in the more 
comprehensive plan. 
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Consumer protections achieved mixed results. Through strenuous efforts by 
public and private agencies, most workers affected by well-publicized economic 
displacements made it onto HCTC before 63 day gaps emerged that would have 
permitted insurers to exclude preexisting conditions. Officials expressed concern that more 
routine, lower- profile displacements could easily lead to gaps lasting 63 days or longer. 
HCTC was used by almost no one who experienced gaps that triggered preexisting-
condition exclusions, since potential beneficiaries apparently viewed such limited coverage 
as not worth the cost. 
 
Widespread marketing fraud was not a major problem, although there 
were isolated instances of fraudulent enrollment. HCTC’s centralized enrollment 
systems prevented the kind of large-scale marketing fraud that was reported for an earlier 
insurance tax credit program that permitted nongroup insurers to obtain credits by directly 
recruiting and enrolling potential beneficiaries. However, some nongroup insurers in 
North Carolina that were not state-qualified plans may have misrepresented themselves to 
a small number of HCTC beneficiaries and defrauded them of premium payments. 
 
In view of these findings, a number of steps are worth serious consideration, both 
to improve HCTC’s ability to help eligible workers and to enable policymakers to 
extrapolate from the HCTC experience in designing broader health insurance tax credits. 
For example, increasing the size of HCTCs (whether for all or some beneficiaries) and 
new federal strategies to get short-term subsidies to qualified individuals promptly—
without asking them to pay monthly premiums in full—will likely be needed to 
substantially increase enrollment. In addition, further simplification and streamlining of 
advance-payment procedures may be required to improve take-up and lower 
administrative costs. Such simplification could give applicants the ability to waive 
confidentiality, thereby permitting direct communication between multiple public and 
private agencies that are trying to help particular individuals enroll. Among other benefits, 
that could permit workers to seek HCTC advance payment by filing one application with 
one agency, which could then communicate with other entities as necessary. Similarly, 
careful refinement of consumer protection rules could prove helpful to beneficiaries, 
government agencies, and health plans alike. 
 
It is likewise important to conduct further research that could provide additional 
information about the problems that have emerged and suggest possible solutions. Only 
after the HCTC program has been strengthened and tested will it be possible for the 
HCTC experiment to yield firm conclusions about the inherent capacity of the federal 
income tax system to subsidize health coverage for the uninsured. 
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EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HEALTH COVERAGE 
TAX CREDIT IN MARYLAND, MICHIGAN, AND NORTH CAROLINA: 
A CASE STUDY SUMMARY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Health policy analysts and political leaders have long proposed using federal income tax 
credits to help uninsured Americans purchase health coverage. But such mechanisms 
remained purely theoretical except for a brief and dismal experience in the early 1990s 
with the so-called “Bentsen Child Health Tax Credits,” a program that benefited few 
eligible children and generated reports of widespread marketing fraud by insurers that 
could obtain tax credits through directly recruiting and enrolling potential beneficiaries. 
This first health insurance tax credit was ended (on a bipartisan basis) after one year of 
implementation.1 
 
In a very different form, health insurance tax credits were enacted for a second 
time when President George W. Bush signed the Trade Act of 2002 on August 6, 2002. 
This legislation created Health Coverage Tax Credits (HCTCs) that pay 65 percent of 
premiums for certain displaced workers and early retirees who enroll in qualified coverage. 
Such coverage primarily consists of COBRA plans sponsored by certain former employers 
and private health plans offered to HCTC beneficiaries by state arrangement. Fully 
refundable, the credit is available to all who qualify, including those whose income is so 
low that they owe little or no federal income tax. In a feature IRS officials labeled 
“revolutionary,” HCTCs can go directly to eligible taxpayers’ health plans each month as 
premiums come due, in advance of filing annual tax forms. Such “advanceability” was 
slated to begin on August 1, 2003, slightly less than a year after the law was signed. 
 
Despite widespread skepticism about the ability of three cabinet-level 
departments—Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury—to work together 
effectively and meet that deadline, advance payment of HCTCs began on the specified 
date, preceded by a one-month “beta test” in several states. In an equally impressive initial 
achievement, enough states were offering qualified insurance by the end of 2003 that 
some 75 percent of the country’s HCTC-eligible individuals could actually use HCTCs to 
enroll in state-arranged coverage.2 
 
Now that these credits, in their advanceable form, have been available for more 
than 18 months, it is appropriate to describe their early implementation and identify any 
lessons learned for improving the program and designing broader health coverage 
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expansions. To achieve these goals, this report analyzes early results from three very 
different states: Maryland, Michigan, and North Carolina. 
 
(For a more detailed explanation of HCTC tax credits, see Appendices A and B.) 
 
STUDY BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
Researchers from the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) began this project 
by reviewing documents that described early HCTC implementation and by interviewing 
national policymakers and stakeholders. In April 2004, The Commonwealth Fund and the 
Nathan Cummings Foundation released the first ESRI report on HCTCs,3 which 
concluded that federal officials, their private contractors, and state officials had achieved 
remarkable success at overcoming a range of daunting obstacles and speedily establishing 
the basic infrastructure of the new program. 
 
There were some concerns noted, however, regarding advance-payment 
enrollment levels, which seemed to indicate that only a small proportion of potentially 
eligible individuals were taking full advantage of HCTCs. The first report also found that 
many HCTC health plans treated beneficiaries very differently based on their age, gender, 
and prior health history; and that the new program’s administrative costs could turn out to 
be quite high (although some of those costs—related to infrastructure establishment—
might eventually be recouped over the lifetimes of both this program and future health 
insurance tax credit initiatives that build on the HCTC model). The report emphasized, 
however, that roughly six months after the start of advance payment, it was far too soon to 
come to any conclusions about the success or failure of HCTCs. 
 
In March through May 2004, ESRI researchers visited Maryland, Michigan, and 
North Carolina to learn more about implementation of HCTCs. These states were chosen 
because their advance-payment enrollment levels were among the highest in the country 
(calculated as a percentage of all individuals who were identified as potentially eligible and 
mailed an HCTC program kit) and because they were diverse in the following ways: the 
types of state-qualified plans they offered; the relative proportions of beneficiaries who 
were eligible because of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and payments from the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC); their geographic distribution; and the 
states’ general economic and political characteristics. Through these visits the researchers 
aimed to learn how—in three very different states—some degree of success had been 
achieved. The investigators also hoped to identify obstacles to effective implementation 
that would challenge even the best of public- and private-sector leaders as well as possible 
strategies for overcoming such obstacles. 
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After examining relevant documents and interviewing representatives of these 
states’ health plans, governments, labor unions, volunteers, and HCTC beneficiaries, the 
authors prepared state-specific case studies, which were shared in draft form with state-
level informants and are now available, in final form, at www.esresearch.org. This paper 
summarizes those three case study reports.* 
 
OVERVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION IN MARYLAND, MICHIGAN, AND 
NORTH CAROLINA 
Compared with other states, the case study states enrolled into advance payment† a 
relatively high percentage of individuals who were identified as potentially eligible for 
HCTC (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Advance-Payment Enrollment,
Case Study States vs. Other States, September 2004
11.5
7.7
9.5
6.1 5.6
0
5
10
15
Maryland Michigan North Carolina National
Average
(including three
study states)
States Outside
the Three Study
States
Notes: (1) Potential eligibles are individuals who were identified by state workforce agencies (SWAs) or PBGC
as potentially qualifying for HCTC and to whom the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) mailed HCTC Program Kits.
(2) Because of concerns about confidentiality, the IRS reported enrollment numbers for Maryland and North
Carolina that were from 1 to 9 enrollees short of the actual number. The percentages listed here represent the
midpoints of these ranges.
Source: HCTC Program, Monthly Executive Scorecard, September 2004, October 13, 2004. Calculations by
ESRI, November 2004.
Percent of potential eligibles who were enrolled in advance payment
 
 
These states also represented varying profiles in terms of the distribution of PBGC- 
and TAA-based eligibility among potentially qualifying workers (Figure 2). 
 
                                                 
* This report departs from the state-specific reports by using September 2004 data, rather than May 
2004 data, on advance-payment enrollment. 
† These numbers do not include beneficiaries who claimed HCTCs only on their annual tax forms. 
Unfortunately, state-specific numbers regarding such claims are not available. 
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Figure 2. Basis for HCTC Eligibility,
Case Study States vs. Other States, September 2004
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Notes: (1) This figure portrays the basis of eligibility for individuals who were identified by SWAs or PBGC as
potentially qualifying for HCTC and to whom IRS mailed HCTC Program Kits. (2) TAA eligibility includes receipt
of TAA income support, eligibility for such support but for receipt of unemployment insurance, and receipt of
Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance (ATAA) provided to certain older, displaced workers.
Sources: HCTC Program, Monthly Executive Scorecard, September 2004, October 13, 2004. Calculations by
ESRI, November 2004.
Percent of HCTC eligibles, by basis of eligibility
 
 
The state-based coverage offered in these three states had several common 
characteristics, First, higher percentages of HCTC beneficiaries chose such coverage in 
Maryland, Michigan, and North Carolina than in other states (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Advance-Payment Enrollment into Types of 
Qualified Coverage, Case Study States vs. Other States 
with State-Qualified Plans, September 2004
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Notes: (1) Prior Nongroup refers to automatically qualified nongroup coverage that beneficiaries received during
at least their final 30 days before job loss or other qualifying event. (2) Because of concerns about confidentiality,
the IRS reported that from 1 to 9 individuals were enrolled in prior nongroup coverage in Maryland and North
Carolina. The percentages listed here represent the midpoints of each range. (3) Other States includes only
states that, in September 2004, offered HCTC beneficiaries state-qualified plans (aside from mini-COBRA plans
offered by small firms to former employees, under state law).
Sources: HCTC Program, Monthly Executive Scorecard, September 2004, October 13, 2004. Calculations by 
ESRI, November 2004.
Percent of advance payment enrollees using coverage type
 
 
 5
Second, although benefit design varied among the three states, each offered 
HCTC beneficiaries a choice between relatively comprehensive coverage and plans with 
high deductibles or other significant cost-sharing (Table 1). 
 
However, the rules governing premiums varied considerably among the three case 
study states. Maryland provided a choice between high-risk pool plans, with premiums 
that varied as a function of age, and a nongroup plan, with “medically underwritten 
premiums” that took individualized health risk into account. Michigan offered two 
community-rated plans, neither of which varied premiums based on beneficiaries’ 
individual characteristics. Finally, North Carolina made nongroup plans available, with 
medically underwritten premiums. (Table 2). The implications of these variations are 
discussed below (see finding #7, p. 17). 
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Table 1. Covered Benefits and Cost-Sharing in State-Qualified Plans, Case Study States, June 2004 
 Maryland Michigan North Carolina 
Plan name MHIP 
PPO 
MHIP 
EPO 
Blue Cross/ 
Blue Shield 
Personal Comp 
Community 
Blue 
Blue 
Value 
Blue 
Advantage, 
Plan A 
Blue 
Advantage, 
Plan B 
Plan type 
High-risk 
pool, PPO 
High-risk 
pool, HMO 
Nongroup 
indemnity plan 
Community-rated PPO Nongroup PPO 
Deductible $1,000 None 
$800 (preventive 
care exempt) 
$250 None 
$250; $500; 
$1,000; $2,500
$500; $1,000; 
$2,500; $5,000 
Factors affecting premium 
(other than choice of plan) Age 
Age and two tiers 
of health risk status
None 
Age, gender, area of residence, 
and five tiers of health risk status 
Network 
20% co-
insurance 
$20/$30 copay 
(primary/ 
specialty visits)
$10 physician 
visit copay. 
20% other. 
50% co-
insurance  
$15/$30 
(primary/ 
specialty visit).
20% other care.
$25/$50 
(primary/ 
specialty visit). 
30% other care. General 
cost-sharing 
Non- 
network 
40% co-
insurance 
N/A (no 
non-network 
coverage) 
25% co-insurance. 
$10 copay for 
preventive care. 
40% co-
insurance 
70% co-
insurance 
30% co-
insurance 
30% office visit. 
40% other care. 
Guaranteed 
issue? 
Yes Yes Yes For enrollees 
with prior 
coverage gaps Preexisting 
conditions? 
No exclusion 6-month exclusion 12-month exclusion 
Prescription 
drugs 
Separate $250 deductible. 
Must use network pharmacies. 
$15/$20/$35 copays. 
$500 annual 
benefit limit  
$10/$40 copays 
for network 
drugs, 25% for 
non-network 
50% copay 
capped at $100 
per 34-day 
supply 
$2,000 annual 
benefit limit. 
$10/$35/$50 
copays. 
Same as plan A, 
plus separate 
$200 
deductible 
Maternity 
care Covered without additional premium charge 
Covered without additional 
premium charge 
Not covered, unless pay 
extra premium 
Mental 
health 
30% co-insurance in network, 
50% non-network. 
Inpatient days capped at 
60/year. 
60-day inpatient 
limit. 
Coinsurance of 
20% for visits 1–5, 
35% for 6-30, 50% 
for 31+ visits. 
50% co-
insurance 
50% co-
insurance for 
inpatient care, 
capped at 
90 days 
50% coinsurance. 
$2,000 annual benefit cap 
per person. 
Lifetime benefit cap of $10,000 
per person. 
Special limits 
for particular 
services 
Other  
$250 inpatient 
copay per 
admission 
 
$500 annual 
limit on 
preventive care
No preventive 
care or office 
visits 
Preventive care limited to 
network 
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Table 2. Cost of State-Based Coverage, One-Person Policies, in Case Study States, June 2004 
Beneficiaries’ annualized 35 percent premium share 
25-year-old woman 
 
Deductible or 
other major 
cost-sharing 
25- 
year-old 
man 
Buying 
maternity 
coverage 
Not buying 
maternity 
coverage 
55- 
year-old 
man 
55- 
year-old 
woman 
MHIP PPO $1,000 $811 $1,415 
MHIP EPO None $1,268 $2,557 
Maryland BCBS: Cost can 
double, depending on 
medical underwriting 
$800 $344 
n/a (policy 
automatically 
includes 
maternity) $667 
Community Blue $250 $1,710 $1,710 
Michigan 
Blue Value 50% co-insurance $1,292 
n/a (policy 
automatically 
includes 
maternity) $1,292 
$250 $483 $1,949 $701 $1,520 $1,575 
$500 $458 $1,894 $668 $1,436 $1,487 
$1,000 $424 $1,798 $613 $1,323 $1,369 
Plan A 
$2,500 $374 $1,436 $538 $1,151 $1,193 
$500 $391 $1,625 $563 $1,210 $1,252 
$1,000 $357 $1,520 $517 $1,109 $1,147 
$2,500 $315 $1,281 $454 $966 $1,000 
North Carolina: Cost can be as 
much as 15 percent lower or up to 
200 percent higher, depending on 
medical underwriting  
Plan B 
$5,000 $281 $941 $403 $853 $882 
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FINDINGS 
The study’s findings fall into three categories: infrastructure, enrollment, and health plans. 
 
Infrastructure 
1. Public and private entities involved in state-level HCTC implementation 
were dedicated, creative, and effective. 
In all three states, gubernatorial leadership was critical in making HCTC implementation a 
top priority for state agencies, health plans, union officials, and others, many of whom did 
extraordinary work on this program. For example: 
 
• In all three states, state and health plan officials devised creative mechanisms to 
prevent workers from being required to pay premiums in full during the months 
when the national program was processing workers’ applications for advance 
payment. Two states (Maryland and North Carolina) developed innovative 
“bridge” or “gap-filler” initiatives that used grants from the U.S. Department of 
Labor (DOL) to pay 65 percent of premiums during those months. Two states 
(Maryland and Michigan) established mechanisms whereby individuals could delay 
coverage (and the resulting obligation to pay premiums) until a future date, after 
the likely start of advance payment. 
 
• In North Carolina, clerical staff from Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North 
Carolina (BCBSNC) volunteered to come in on Sundays to complete the data 
entry work required for displaced workers to enroll promptly into HCTC 
coverage. At a factory where major layoffs had occurred, a Community Services 
Center—staffed by 13 public and private agencies, with government funding 
supplemented by about $900,000 collected from local organizations—was opened 
within four days of the plant closing. Local churches “adopted” laid-off workers 
and helped pay their premiums as HCTC coverage was getting started. A local 
retiree worked full-time without pay, for months, educating workers and helping 
them enroll. 
 
• In Maryland, one state official was celebrated for his willingness to show up on job 
sites at any requested hour, including midnight sessions to educate graveyard-shift 
workers about HCTC benefits and to help them sign up. Another official 
negotiated details of state-based coverage by phone from the hospital where his 
wife was in labor with their first child. 
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• In Michigan, one union officer was responsible for helping large numbers of 
people—union members as well as many others—obtain HCTCs. He worked day 
and night for several months educating retirees about HCTC benefits, helping 
them fill out forms and solve emerging problems, and serving as liaison between 
the applicants and state, national, and health plan officials. 
 
• In all three states, government officials worked together effectively across agency 
boundaries to get HCTC-related systems up and running in remarkably brief 
periods of time. The level of cooperation and disregard of organizational turf 
were striking. 
 
2. Agencies involved in national HCTC implementation received generally 
positive reviews. 
In all three states, public and private stakeholders expressed gratitude for the very high 
quality of service they received from the Treasury Department, the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), and the private contractors working with the IRS. Virtually without 
exception, state-level stakeholders described the staffs of these organizations as responsive, 
dedicated, and nimble in solving emerging problems. For example, federal officials’ 
commitment to this program included participation in a number of local community 
education events to inform workers about available benefits. 
 
In another example of their creativity and commitment, federal officials instituted 
regular monthly reviews of eligibility lists provided by State Workforce Agencies (SWAs). 
When those lists did not include displaced workers who previously had received advance 
payment, the officials asked the state agencies to investigate. In many cases, eligible 
workers had been left off the lists by mistake. This review procedure caught and rectified 
many such errors, thereby preserving displaced workers’ health coverage. 
 
The leadership at DOL, however, was viewed with more ambivalence by state and 
local stakeholders. On the one hand, officials in several states had to wait many months 
before receiving DOL responses to their proposed use of NEG grants to pay 65 percent of 
premiums for workers awaiting IRS rulings on their applications for advance payment. On 
the other hand, DOL received accolades for ultimately changing its policy in response to 
unforeseen developments and approving these projects, even though they were not 
squarely within the agency’s original conception of permitted uses for these NEG funds.4 
 
More broadly, the absence of DOL guidance on a number of issues meant that 
officials at SWAs were required to devise their own state-specific approaches for dealing 
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with common questions, creating some unnecessary administrative costs. For example, 
some computer programming had to be done from scratch in each state’s SWA, even 
though multiple states faced similar problems. A single national model might have greatly 
reduced the amount of required programming. 
 
Feedback on the HCTC program’s national call center varied from state to state, 
though all informants agreed that the center’s performance improved substantially over the 
first six months of operation. Nevertheless, the North Carolina interviewees reported that 
the call center was unable to meet the needs of the state’s HCTC-eligible population. For 
example, call center staff allegedly used language that beneficiaries found difficult to 
understand, and they failed to provide the intensive, hands-on assistance needed for many 
beneficiaries to enroll into advance payment. In the two other states, some beneficiaries 
found the call center helpful, while others shared the view prevalent in North Carolina. 
 
We observed similarly mixed reactions to the outreach materials furnished by the 
national HCTC program. North Carolina informants uniformly reported that the HCTC 
Program Kit was far too complicated for beneficiaries to understand. In Michigan and 
Maryland, by contrast, while some found the kit unintelligible and intimidating, other 
beneficiaries found it helpful. 
 
3. The process of beneficiary enrollment into advance payment was complex, 
which increased administrative costs and limited take-up. 
To benefit from HCTC advance payment, a displaced worker was required to take at least 
three steps with three different entities: apply at the SWA for TAA assistance,‡ obtain 
health coverage from a qualified health plan, and apply to the HCTC national office for 
the start of advance payment. 
 
In some cases, displaced workers seeking TAA-related coverage also needed to file 
a petition with DOL (a fourth agency) seeking a determination that the layoff at issue was 
trade-related. Moreover, in Maryland and North Carolina, which used DOL funding to 
pay 65 percent of health insurance premiums pending the start of advance payment, 
workers seeking such immediate assistance needed to complete an additional application. 
In Maryland, this extra application had to be filed with an agency that, for most applicants, 
was distinct from those taking the other HCTC-related applications (in other words, 
potentially a fifth agency). 
 
                                                 
‡ This step was not required of PBGC payment recipients, who were mailed HCTC program kits 
automatically. 
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To further complicate the application process, workers were responsible for passing 
documentation, in hard-copy form, back and forth between various entities to which they 
were applying. In all of the case study states, beneficiaries had to provide the HCTC call 
center with invoices from their qualified health plans. In two of the three states, state-
qualified health plans asked workers, before enrollment, to furnish proof that they were 
on the list of individuals who potentially qualified for HCTCs, either through TAA 
or PBGC. The two “gap-filler” programs we studied also required hard copies of 
pertinent documents. 
 
When problems have emerged with advance payment, the HCTC program’s 
general policy has been to require the worker to take the lead in diagnosing and solving 
them. Despite the excellent coordination among the public and private agencies 
administering this program at the national level, only rarely have federal, state, and health 
plan officials been able to communicate directly with one another about the problems 
encountered by a particular consumer, much less to use automated data exchanges as the 
principal means of conveying all critical information. This pattern has resulted, in part, 
from federal officials’ generally laudable commitment to keeping taxpayer information 
confidential. But it has also required the HCTC program, SWAs, health plans, union staff, 
and community volunteers to devote tremendous amounts of time and resources to 
helping individual consumers navigate through this complex system to obtain and retain 
coverage. For example: 
 
• A local SWA office in North Carolina required displaced workers to come to the 
office to speak by phone with federal officials in front of the SWA staff, who only 
then could obtain the technical information to help them determine why the 
workers hadn’t yet received their HCTCs. Federal agency staff would not provide 
this information directly to SWA officials, even though the beneficiaries had asked 
them to do so. 
 
• In late 2003, when BCBSNC decided to increase premiums beginning in January 
2004, the company sought to inform the national HCTC program about these 
premium changes in advance so future HCTC invoices sent to workers would 
reflect the correct, revised premiums. Federal officials did not agree to enter the 
new North Carolina premium amounts into their system, stating that the health 
plan instead had to educate workers about their new premium costs—and that the 
workers, in turn, would need to relay their new premium levels to the IRS in a 
timely fashion. BCBSNC attempted to educate the company’s HCTC members 
about this procedural requirement, assigning five customer service workers full-
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time to the task. Despite this effort, many members still did not understand their 
situation and so did not inform the IRS of the new premium levels. As a result, 
BCBSNC had to bill these consumers for the full difference between the 2003 and 
2004 premiums. Given the resulting confusion and disaffection (together with the 
higher costs imposed by the new premium levels), 20 percent of HCTC enrollees 
dropped out of the plan. 
 
• The IRS used Social Security numbers (SSNs) to identify HCTC enrollees. Unlike 
many HCTC plans elsewhere in the country, Maryland’s MHIP (the major state-
qualified insurer) used members’ insurance policy numbers rather than SSNs as 
individual identifiers. To further complicate matters, when the Treasury 
Department sent money to the insurer’s bank, the standard, national electronic 
message form did not have room for SSNs and instead used bank account 
identifiers. As a result, with each month’s payment, MHIP’s third-party 
administrator went through a lengthy process of reconciling the bank account 
identifier with the member’s health plan identifier and SSN. The data systems 
were not coordinated, so most of this work had to be done by hand. 
 
• To facilitate HCTC enrollment, SWA staff worked intensively with potential 
beneficiaries, helping them complete required forms and take other steps to begin 
and retain advance payment. However, DOL did not generally allow NEG 
administrative grants to pay for these expenses. Such NEG grants covered data 
processing, initial infrastructure development, and related activities, but not one-
on-one assistance. As a result, SWAs in the case study states had to use other 
resources to cover some of their HCTC-related administrative costs. 
 
• During the first months of the HCTC program, Maryland’s enrollment rate was far 
higher than that of any other state. One important reason for this success was that 
PBGC furnished MHIP with a computerized listing of all potentially eligible 
PBGC recipients in Maryland. With that information loaded into their laptops, 
MHIP staff could verify eligibility and immediately enroll qualified individuals at 
outreach events. Because of legal and policy issues concerning beneficiary 
confidentiality, PBGC later discontinued providing such information, making the 
enrollment process much more cumbersome. This was one important reason why 
the state’s enrollment later grew only modestly relative to its early levels. 
 
However, steps are being taken to simplify the enrollment process. In several 
promising developments, the HCTC program has moved forward with confidentiality 
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waivers and electronic provision of information in order to expedite beneficiaries’ 
enrollment into advance payment. First, in a pilot project with Maryland and Virginia, the 
HCTC call center has asked callers if their contact information could be shared with state 
government so that callers can qualify for additional benefits, such as bridge or “gap filler” 
coverage pending the start of advance payment. Four of five callers (80%) have consented. 
This innovation led to faster health coverage for eligible workers, increased take-up, and 
fewer duplicate payments by state bridge programs and HCTC.5 
 
Second, even before the U.S. Government Accountability Office issued a report 
that addressed this topic,6 HCTC officials agreed that, when premiums are about to 
change for multiple beneficiaries, health plans can act on behalf of their enrollees in 
providing the pertinent information to the HCTC program, which will then incorporate 
that information into its revised billing to beneficiaries. Approximately 30 percent of 
HCTC premium changes made between March and October 2004 were such bulk 
premium changes instituted at health plans’ request. If these new procedures had been 
operative when, in the above example, BCBSNC was preparing to increase premium 
amounts for January 2004, BCBSNC could simply have given the HCTC program a 
spreadsheet showing the new premium levels for each beneficiary. This would have 
greatly lowered the plan’s administrative costs and prevented some disenrollment. 
 
Third, in its proposed budget for FY 2006, the Bush Administration has 
recommended several changes to the HCTC program, one of which “would allow 
disclosure of certain information necessary to carry out the advance payment program to 
providers of health insurance or their contractors.”7 As this report goes to press, no 
additional published information provides more details about this proposal. Nevertheless, 
all three developments are signposts in the direction of more efficient, consumer-friendly 
procedures that can reduce administrative costs and increase enrollment and retention. 
They also serve as another reminder of the responsive and creative administration of this 
novel program by Treasury, the IRS, and the HCTC program’s private contractors. 
 
Enrollment 
4. Take-up of advance payment was helped by fortuitous timing, which 
resulted in favorable publicity and encouraged strong commitments by 
public and private officials. 
Each of the three states experienced major economic dislocations as the HCTC program 
was getting under way. In 2003, Maryland and Michigan both saw Bethlehem Steel, an 
important employer, terminate pension payments and retiree health coverage, thereby 
affecting thousands of workers in each state. In Maryland, the state was simultaneously 
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creating its high-risk pool, which further increased media attention both to workers losing 
health coverage and to HCTCs as a vehicle to subsidize their enrollment into the new 
high-risk pool. In North Carolina, the Pillowtex manufacturing plant closing represented 
the largest layoff in that state’s history. Stakeholders in each of the case study states 
wondered whether the collective response over the long run would be as intense and 
effective for smaller dislocations that did not receive the same degree of public attention. 
 
5. Most informants agreed that beneficiaries’ inability to afford the 35 percent 
premium share was the principal reason why so few enrolled in advance 
payment. 
According to virtually all informants in North Carolina and Michigan, by far the most 
important factor limiting take-up of advance payment was that many beneficiaries found 
their 35 percent premium share to be too expensive. In the words of one health plan 
official, “affordability is the first, second, and third reason why so few eligible workers 
enroll.” 
 
Maryland was the only state in which the informants did not list affordability as the 
primary barrier to enrollment. One possible explanation for this difference may be the 
state’s comparatively higher-income uninsured population. In Maryland, 59 percent of all 
uninsured individuals had incomes above 200 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) 
in 2002,8 compared with 36 percent in the country as a whole.9 
 
A second enrollment barrier mentioned by many informants was the failure of 
advance payment to begin for several months, consequently obliging beneficiaries to pay 
their first months’ premiums in full. In the one state we visited (North Carolina) that had 
fully implemented a bridge or “gap-filler” program to subsidize those initial premium 
payments,§ stakeholders agreed that the program had a significant positive impact on 
participation. 
 
The third major cause of low take-up, mentioned by numerous informants in all 
three states, was the complex process required to enroll and remain in advance payment, 
described above. 
 
Of course, an unknown number of potentially eligible individuals did not enroll in 
HCTC advance payment simply because they received health coverage from other 
sources, including new employers or spousal employers. The prevalence of such 
alternative sources of coverage was uncertain, however, and seemed to vary by state. 
                                                 
§ When we visited Maryland, its “gap-filler” program was just getting started. 
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Informants in North Carolina and Michigan generally believed that most HCTC-eligible 
workers who did not enroll in advance payment went without insurance coverage 
altogether. In Maryland, by contrast, interviewees had the impression that many workers 
who did not receive HCTC advance payment obtained health coverage from other 
sources. 
 
Similarly, the case study states apparently differed in the extent to which 
beneficiaries had the household resources to pay premiums in full each month during the 
year and then claim HCTCs on their year-end tax forms. In North Carolina, study 
informants unanimously reported that only a tiny fraction of HCTC-eligible workers had 
this capacity. In Michigan and Maryland, it appeared that a larger number of eligible 
workers, though still a minority, may have been able to file for year-end HCTCs. 
 
Some preliminary national data are available that describe year-end HCTC 
payments for 2003 and that allow some limited, “ballpark” comparison with advance 
payment enrollment. As of May 2004, 12,594 tax filers had received year-end HCTCs for 
January through December 2003, based solely on their tax returns, without any advance 
payment.10 From August through December 2003, 11,917 households enrolled in HCTC 
advance payment.11 Accordingly, in 2003, the number of households receiving advance 
payment nearly equaled the number claiming HCTCs only on their annual tax returns. It 
remains to be seen whether that relationship will hold in 2004 and beyond, however. 
With advance payment beginning in August but annual refunds available for qualified 
coverage purchased at any time from January through December, 2003 was a unique year 
for the HCTC program. 
 
We found no evidence supporting two hypotheses that the lead author of this 
report had previously advanced to explain low take-up.12 First, TAA training requirements 
did not pose a problem in the three case study states, each of which liberally granted 
training waivers for HCTC purposes. Training requirements may become more 
problematic in the future, however, as the TAA statute forbids such waivers for displaced 
workers after they have received one year of TAA benefits. To obtain HCTCs after the 
conclusion of that year, displaced workers will need to meet TAA training requirements, 
without waivers. 
 
Regarding the second hypothesis that was not supported by the site visits, SWAs 
appeared to have effective means at their disposal for reaching HCTC-eligible recipients 
of unemployment insurance. In the states profiled here, SWAs educated employers and 
their laid-off workers about the full range of TAA services, including HCTC. Workers 
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could apply for HCTC by filing requests for training, training waivers, or TAA cash 
assistance. Maryland’s SWA used a particularly effective strategy of supplementing such 
outreach efforts by querying the state’s unemployment insurance (UI) database to identify 
UI recipients whose last employer was on the list of Maryland firms that had been certified 
by DOL as trade-affected. Those recipients were then contacted, informed about HCTC, 
and given the opportunity to apply. Maryland officials reported that this query was not 
burdensome to develop or to run on a regular basis, suggesting that other states might 
profitably consider adopting similar practices. 
 
Finally, we likewise found little evidence to support another hypothesis that some 
have advanced to explain low take-up—namely, that HCTC’s consumer protection 
requirements deterred health plan participation. Without doubt, those requirements may 
have reduced the number of participating insurers. It does not follow, however, that the 
limited number of insurance carriers offering qualified coverage in each state was the 
primary reason that relatively few potential beneficiaries enrolled. It is true that each state 
we visited had only one or two carriers participating in HCTC. However, beneficiaries in 
each state had a number of plans from which to choose, including both comprehensive 
and high-deductible or other high-cost-sharing options. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, which 
offered qualified coverage in all three case study states, including the company’s flagship 
product in North Carolina, had a dominant market share (above 50 percent) in all three 
states’ nongroup markets.13 Although some federal officials believed that enrollment could 
have been higher if workers had more flexibility to choose the health plans that qualified 
for HCTCs, no interviewees at the state level suggested that offering more health plan 
choices to HCTC beneficiaries would have had a significant effect on take-up. 
 
Health Plans 
6. Most (but not all) beneficiaries preferred comprehensive benefits, despite 
the higher resulting premiums. 
Given a choice between more and less comprehensive coverage, HCTC enrollees into 
state-based plans typically chose the former: 
 
• In Maryland, 60 percent of beneficiaries who enrolled in the Maryland Health 
Insurance Plan (MHIP) chose the comprehensive HMO option, which had no 
deductible and cost roughly 50 percent more than MHIP’s PPO, which had a 
$1,000 deductible. By contrast, among general, unsubsidized enrollees into MHIP, 
85 percent chose the PPO. 
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• In Michigan, every advance payment beneficiary enrolled in state-qualified 
coverage chose Community Blue—which had a $250 deductible, $10 copayments, 
and 20 percent co-insurance—even though premiums were 32 percent higher than 
for the Blue Value coverage, which had co-insurance of 50 percent or more and 
which excluded office visits and preventive care. 
 
• In North Carolina, 77 percent of beneficiaries enrolled in the more generous Plan 
A, and only 23 percent chose Plan B. Between both plans, 52 percent of HCTC 
beneficiaries selected coverage with $250 or $500 deductibles, rather than plans 
with deductibles of $1,000, $2,500, or $5,000, even though coverage with lower 
deductibles cost between 22 and 70 percent more (depending on the beneficiary 
and the plan involved). Before they learned the results of medical underwriting, 
even more beneficiaries had enrolled in the most comprehensive options; many 
switched to less comprehensive choices after receiving individualized (and 
unexpectedly high) premium quotes. 
 
A number of HCTC beneficiaries in North Carolina expressed strong 
dissatisfaction with the less comprehensive plans that they ultimately selected in order to 
limit their premium costs. Until deductibles were satisfied, these plans did not cover any 
medical expenses. As a result, the workers who enrolled in such low-premium coverage 
reported that they sometimes went without necessary health care. For example, some 
adults with chronic illness did not refill maintenance medication that had been prescribed 
to prevent their conditions from worsening. Ultimately, some of these workers perceived 
their high-deductible coverage as so useless that they disenrolled. 
 
7. Health coverage with pure or modified community rating avoided some 
serious problems of nongroup coverage that based premium levels on 
individualized assessment of health risk. 
One of the most important differences among the case study states involved the possibility 
of varying premiums based on beneficiaries’ individual characteristics. Michigan’s coverage 
was purely community rated; for a given plan, each HCTC beneficiary paid the same 
amount for coverage, regardless of his or her age, gender, area of residence, or prior health 
history. Likewise, Maryland’s high-risk pool used modified community rating—that is, 
premiums for each plan varied only by the enrollee’s age. Maryland’s nongroup plan** 
varied premiums by age and the beneficiary’s placement into one of two risk tiers, based 
                                                 
** At the time of our visit, the high-risk pool served roughly 500 HCTC beneficiaries, and Maryland’s 
nongroup plan had 7 HCTC enrollees. According to our informants, low enrollment numbers in the 
nongroup plan resulted mainly from its delayed entry into the market as an HCTC-qualified plan and from 
its limited coverage of prescription drugs. 
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on an assessment of each individual’s health history and status. North Carolina’s rating 
rules varied premiums based on age, gender, area of residence, women’s election of 
coverage for routine maternity care, and placement into one of five risk tiers based on 
individual medical underwriting. These different rating practices largely reflected each 
state’s health insurance rules that applied to the general population. 
 
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the extent of premium variation in Maryland and North 
Carolina for individuals using HCTCs to purchase weighted-average, state-qualified 
coverage. Michigan’s premiums are not portrayed, since each enrollee was charged the 
same amount—namely, $1,710 as the beneficiary’s annualized, 35 percent premium share. 
 
Figure 4. Annualized 35 Percent Beneficiary Premium 
Share for Various Individuals Receiving Average State-
Based, One-Person Coverage in Maryland, June 2004
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Notes: (1) The average MHIP premium was based on premiums for each age group and plan, weighted based
on total HCTC enrollment into both MHIP plans. (2) Only one CareFirst plan was offered to HCTC beneficiaries.
The premium amounts for each age and risk combination were provided by CareFirst.
Sources: MHIP, CareFirst. Calculations by ESRI, March 2005.
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Figure 5. Annualized 35 Percent Beneficiary Premium 
Share for Various Individuals Receiving Average State-
Based, One-Person Coverage in North Carolina, June 2004
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Notes: (1) This figure shows the premiums that would be charged to various individuals for a single, weighted-
average plan, determined based on total HCTC enrollment into all state-qualified options. (2) Lowest-risk and 
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These data show that, predictably, premiums did not vary enormously in the two 
states that used pure or modified community rating. For example, in Maryland: 
 
• Gender did not affect premiums. 
• Individual health risk did not affect premiums charged in the high-risk pool. 
• Individual health risk could increase premiums by 100 percent for the 
nongroup plan. 
• 55-year-olds paid 94 percent more than did 25-year-olds. 
 
North Carolina’s premium differences were both more numerous and, in some 
cases, much larger: 
 
• Women age 25 who chose coverage that excluded routine maternity care had 
premiums that were 45 percent higher than those for 25-year-old men purchasing 
the same coverage. Among 55-year-olds, female gender had a much smaller 
impact, raising premiums by only 4 percent. 
• 25-year-old women who added routine maternity care to their coverage thereby 
increased premiums by 179 percent. 
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• The impact of age was considerable. Among men, premiums were 211 percent 
higher for 55-year-olds than for 25-year-olds. Among women, 55-year-olds were 
charged 123 percent more. 
• For all ages and genders, placement in the highest rather than the lowest risk tier 
increased premiums by 253 percent. 
• Among 25- to 55-year-olds, all these factors combined could raise premiums by 
1,322 percent.†† 
 
In Michigan and Maryland, neither health plans, state officials, nor other 
stakeholders expressed dissatisfaction with their states’ rating rules for HCTC coverage. 
On the other hand, North Carolina’s rating rules created tremendous dissatisfaction, 
according to virtually every stakeholder interviewed for this report. Many found it unfair 
that HCTC coverage was least affordable to those who needed it most, with premiums 
that varied dramatically based on factors outside the individual’s control. 
 
North Carolina’s medical underwriting process also had a significant impact on 
take-up. When they first applied for coverage, HCTC beneficiaries were quoted 
premiums in the second-best risk tier, as is standard practice for this coverage. At that 
time, the health plan warned that these quotes were nothing more than estimates and that 
the actual premium could be higher or lower. After medical underwriting was completed, 
70 percent of these applicants saw their premium rates rise above the initial quote, and 69 
percent of those in this disappointed group withdrew their applications. If this drop-off 
had not taken place, more than 3,900 additional North Carolinians could have received 
advance payment, increasing total national HCTC enrollment by 42 percent.14 
 
These results occurred even though BCBSNC exempted HCTC beneficiaries 
from the company’s two highest risk tiers, which could have more than doubled 
premiums above the largest amounts charged to HCTC beneficiaries. If the company had 
instead applied its standard risk-rating rules, the premium differences, the consequent 
impact on enrollment, and the level of public disaffection might have been even greater. 
 
8. Some adverse selection and risk segmentation among plan options may 
have taken place. 
Because Maryland had been serving HCTC beneficiaries since July 2003 (the earliest 
among the three case study states), MHIP had sufficient experience to provide ESRI’s 
                                                 
†† This represents the difference between premiums for low-risk, 25-year-old men and those charged to 
high-risk, 25-year-old women choosing maternity care coverage. 
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research team with pertinent claims data. These records showed a sharp difference 
between HCTC enrollees into MHIP’s more generous HMO (which had no deductible) 
and those choosing the less expensive but less comprehensive PPO (which had a $1,000 
deductible). Between July 2003 and May 2004, average per-member-per-month claims 
were much higher for HCTC beneficiaries enrolled in the HMO than for those in the 
PPO ($2,817 vs. $433). Of course, these were raw numbers and not adjusted for enrollees’ 
age. Nevertheless, state officials were convinced that significant adverse selection and risk 
segmentation might have taken place in HCTC beneficiaries’ choices among plans, with 
individuals who foresaw large health care costs disproportionately choosing the more 
comprehensive coverage.‡‡ 
 
9. Consumer protections in the federal statute had mixed results. 
Under the Trade Act, if a beneficiary experiences a gap in coverage lasting 63 days or 
longer before enrolling in a state-qualified plan, the plan can exclude preexisting 
conditions for up to 12 months or even refuse to issue a policy. The study informants 
agreed that this posed a considerable challenge, as 63 days or more could easily pass 
between job loss and the start of HCTC advance payment. For example, because the state 
agency responsible for unemployment insurance in Michigan had been recently 
restructured at the time of the site visit and was thinly staffed, it was not unusual for more 
than 40 days to pass between a worker’s application for TAA and the agency’s full 
processing of the application. Only after such processing was complete would the 
Michigan SWA transmit the worker’s information to the national HCTC program, which 
would then mail the worker information about the HCTC program and encourage the 
worker to apply for advance payment and enroll in an HCTC health plan. Such 
processing times compounded other delays, such as that resulting from the statutory 
prohibition against granting TAA (and HCTC) during the first 60 days after DOL receives 
a petition seeking a determination of trade-related adverse impact. 
 
Notwithstanding these challenges, officials in all three states worked very hard to 
prevent potential beneficiaries from experiencing gaps in coverage lasting 63 days or more. 
As a result, most Bethlehem Steel retirees (in Michigan and Maryland) and workers 
displaced by Pillowtex (in North Carolina) who wished to apply for HCTC coverage 
could do so before they experienced a 63-day gap. However, in states or communities 
experiencing smaller economic setbacks that received less attention, the vigorous steps that 
                                                 
‡‡ In contrast, the per-member-per-month cost in MHIP’s general population varied little between 
HMO and PPO enrollees—respectively $2,326 vs. $2,016. This outcome may have resulted from the 
explicit limitation of general MHIP eligibility to medically uninsurable individuals, most of whom 
presumably incur significant ongoing costs, regardless of which plan they choose. HCTC, on the other 
hand, is open to both the healthy and the chronically ill, so healthy individuals can sort themselves into less 
expensive plans. 
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retained continuous coverage in high-profile dislocations may not have been as likely, 
according to study informants. The resulting gaps in coverage would subject workers to 
preexisting-condition exclusions. 
 
Although federal law permits state-qualified plans to deny coverage outright and to 
impose preexisting-condition exclusions when beneficiaries lack continuous coverage, it 
does not require them to do so. Accordingly, in the case study states, all state-qualified plans 
guaranteed the issue of policies to HCTC beneficiaries experiencing prior coverage lapses. 
Moreover, in Maryland both the high-risk pool and the nongroup plan have been 
available at various times without any preexisting-condition exclusions for HCTC 
beneficiaries who had coverage gaps, and neither insurer reported any resulting problems. 
However, state-qualified plans in Michigan and North Carolina did impose preexisting-
condition exclusions for individuals without prior continuous coverage. Such exclusions 
lasted for six months in Michigan (because of state law) and 12 months in North Carolina. 
 
According to study informants, when coverage gaps led to preexisting-condition 
exclusions, almost no one enrolled into HCTC advance payment. Potential beneficiaries 
apparently perceived the resulting, limited coverage as not worth the 35 percent premium 
cost.§§ 
 
10. Widespread enrollment fraud did not materialize, but isolated problems 
emerged. 
In all three states, enrollment was centralized. TAA-related individuals had to go to their 
SWA, and all HCTC beneficiaries seeking advance payment needed to enroll in a 
qualified plan and contact the national HCTC office. These centralized points of entry 
made it difficult for rogue insurers to engage in marketing abuses, such as those widely 
reported in connection with the Bentsen Child Health Tax Credits in the late 1990s.15 
Under that earlier program, insurers could market themselves directly to potential 
beneficiaries and obtain their tax credits by enrolling them into coverage. By avoiding 
such open-ended enrollment options under the direct control of insurers, the HCTC 
program prevented the recurrence of similar large-scale abuses in the three study states. 
 
However, some nongroup insurers in North Carolina that were not state-qualified 
plans might have misrepresented themselves to a small number of HCTC beneficiaries and 
                                                 
§§ Officials in Virginia came to the similar conclusion that “timeliness is everything.” In that state, direct 
mail obtained only a 5 percent response rate when it was sent to individuals receiving benefits who, for the 
most part, had prior coverage lapses. When face-to-face rapid response took place before the 62-day 
window closed, more than 66 percent of potential beneficiaries responded. Health Coverage Tax Credit 
Program. HCTC-NEG Bridge Pilot. July 2004. 
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defrauded them of premium payments, according to observers. When workers laid off by 
Pillowtex were congregating at the mill to receive training and assistance regarding 
available benefits, some nongroup insurers that did not offer state-qualified coverage 
placed tents nearby. Agents of these plans apparently urged some of the laid-off workers in 
attendance to write their first month’s premium checks on the spot, falsely promising that 
HCTCs would reimburse the workers later. This alleged abuse seemed to represent an 
isolated occurrence, but it provided an important reminder of the problems that could 
become widespread in a more weakly structured environment. 
 
AREAS FOR POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENT 
This report seeks to provide information that will allow policymakers to achieve two 
different objectives: namely, to enhance the help that HCTCs provide to their current 
target population; and to use the HCTC experience to guide the future design of 
measures to cover other, potentially much larger groups of uninsured Americans. To reach 
these goals, the following policy approaches may be worth considering: 
 
1. Increase the percentage of premium covered by HCTCs. 
This can be done for either all beneficiaries or those with low incomes. Unless this 
obstacle to enrollment is addressed, take-up is likely to remain low, according to most of 
the study informants. 
 
2. Simplify and streamline advance-payment procedures for beneficiary 
enrollment. 
If the IRS developed procedures that permitted individuals to apply for HCTC advance 
payment by submitting a single form to a single entity, administrative costs could fall and 
take-up rates could rise. Such procedures could include the applicant’s waiver of privacy 
rights under the tax code, the PBGC program, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), and other pertinent laws. With such comprehensive privacy 
waivers, all entities involved in HCTC—health plans, their third-party administrators, the 
national HCTC program, SWAs, and PBGC—could share information (via automated 
data exchange, whenever possible) to ensure the timely receipt of coverage by individuals 
who legitimately qualify for credits. 
 
3. Provide immediate assistance. 
Many beneficiaries lack the excess income in household budgets to pay even one or two 
months’ premiums in full. To address the need for immediate subsidies once workers have 
lost prior coverage, bridge or “gap-filler” programs like those in North Carolina and 
Maryland could be instituted in additional states as a stopgap measure. More 
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comprehensively, Congress could authorize the IRS to provide a short-term, advanceable 
credit payable immediately upon certification by a designated agency that individuals are 
enrolled in qualified health plans and that they are on eligibility lists transmitted to the IRS 
by an SWA or PBGC. Such designated agencies could include qualified health plans 
and SWAs. 
 
4. Fund case management services for enrollment and retention. 
Until the advance-payment system is significantly streamlined, many HCTC beneficiaries 
will need a good deal of assistance enrolling in and retaining advance payment. A variety 
of public and private entities, including SWAs, health plans, unions, the HCTC call 
center, and consumer advocates, have the potential capacity to provide such assistance. 
However, financial support is required for this capacity to be realized on an ongoing basis. 
If present NEG grant amounts and IRS administrative appropriations are insufficient, 
more resources should perhaps be provided, through either these or other funding streams. 
 
5. Address concerns about consumer protections. 
Congress could revise the HCTC consumer protection rules to disregard, for purposes of 
determining whether an individual has had continuous coverage, two periods of time: the 
interval between job loss or other qualifying event and an individual’s receipt of notice of 
potential HCTC eligibility; and the interval between an individual’s application for 
advance payment and the start of advance payment. This approach would seek to 
accomplish two goals at once: first, preventing administrative delays from causing 
essentially involuntary gaps in coverage that terminate consumer protections; and second, 
withholding consumer protections from any beneficiaries who deliberately wait until they 
get sick before using their HCTCs to enroll in coverage. 
 
6. Address concerns about nongroup coverage with medically underwritten 
premiums. 
It is premature, based on these case studies alone, to come to broad conclusions about tax 
credits used for nongroup coverage. Nevertheless, North Carolina’s problematic 
experience suggests an urgent need to conduct further research that explores the 
consequences of using HCTCs to subsidize nongroup coverage with medically 
underwritten premiums that vary substantially based on individual risk. 
 
7. Expand the kinds of research done by the IRS. 
To gain a broader understanding of enrollment trends for advance payment, the IRS could 
analyze aggregate information from filed income tax forms for 2003 to compare the 
characteristics of five types of individuals: those who were mailed HCTC Program Kits 
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but did not apply for advance payment; those who attempted to enroll in HCTC advance 
payment but did not complete that process; those who successfully enrolled in HCTC 
advance payment; those who filed for HCTCs on their annual tax form exclusively; and 
those who obtained HCTCs through both advance payment and refund claims on annual 
tax forms. If used in aggregate form to respect the confidentiality of individual taxpayer 
information, this analysis could include income,*** which could potentially provide 
important information about the role of affordability in limiting take-up. 
 
In addition to analyzing tax return information, the IRS could conduct a new 
round of HCTC surveys. These might investigate, among other things, the reasons why 
individuals who were mailed HCTC Program Kits did not enroll, including the 
proportion who received coverage from other sources and therefore may not have needed 
or qualified for HCTCs. The surveys could also evaluate access to health care and degree 
of satisfaction with such care among potential beneficiaries who enrolled in various forms 
of HCTC-qualified coverage; those who were uninsured; and those who received 
coverage from other sources (without using HCTCs). 
 
One final category of needed research would require congressional authorization. 
The IRS could be empowered to conduct demonstration projects that involve changes to 
the HCTC program. Such authorization could be quite open-ended, modeled after 
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act. This would permit the IRS to investigate and test 
a broad range of hypotheses and alternative strategies that could result in substantial 
improvements in program design, as well as in greatly enhanced knowledge about the 
capacity of tax credits to assist individuals losing health coverage. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR STRUCTURING BROADER COVERAGE 
EXPANSIONS 
Based on the HCTC experience to date, we do not yet know whether income tax credits 
for the purchase of health coverage can achieve the following: 
 
• use of efficient, consumer-friendly methods for enrolling into advance payment 
without multiple applications, extensive paperwork requirements, and significant 
beneficiary confusion; 
• rapid commencement of advance payments by the federal income tax system, 
without requiring beneficiaries to pay full monthly premiums while the IRS is 
determining their eligibility for advance payment; and 
                                                 
*** For individuals who neither claimed HCTCs nor filed annual income-tax returns, such non-filing 
could serve as a proxy indicator that household income may have been low. 
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• limitation of administrative costs to reasonable levels. 
 
Even if credits can in principle accomplish these goals, important policy design 
questions need to be answered—on the basis of real-world experience—before 
policymakers can be confident of success in the expansion of tax credits to serve additional 
populations. Here are some of the key questions that could benefit from further research 
into the HCTC program: 
 
• What level of subsidy and what enrollment mechanisms lead to significant take-up 
by eligible individuals who would otherwise be uninsured? 
• What trade-offs result from using tax credits to subsidize enrollment in nongroup 
plans with medically underwritten premiums that vary greatly based on individual 
health risks? 
• What level of adverse selection and risk segmentation is likely to result from 
diverse health plan offerings open to tax credit beneficiaries? How can the extent 
or harmful consequences of such segmentation be reduced? 
 
CONCLUSION 
While it is still too soon to reach a verdict on the nation’s second experiment with using 
the federal income tax system to subsidize health coverage for the uninsured, the good 
news is that thousands of vulnerable individuals have received essential assistance. 
Moreover, officials at all levels, public and private, have done extraordinary work to 
establish the new system’s infrastructure, to prevent significant marketing fraud, and to 
make the existing policy as useful as possible to displaced workers and early retirees who 
need and qualify for help. 
 
However, significant problems have emerged. If policymakers wish to establish the 
viability of tax credits for expanding health coverage for millions of uninsured Americans, 
it is important to conduct further research that will analyze emerging problems with 
HCTCs and identify potential solutions. At a fundamental level, only if HCTCs are 
adjusted to be as effective as possible can policymakers use the HCTC experience to gauge 
the inherent capacity of tax credits to cover the uninsured. 
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APPENDIX A. NATIONAL HCTC RULES 
 
Comprehensive explanations of the Health Coverage Tax Credits (HCTC) 
program are available elsewhere.16 For the purposes of this report, however, the following 
brief summary may be helpful: 
 
Eligibility. Several groups qualify for HCTCs: 
 
• Displaced workers whose layoffs have been certified by the U.S. Department of 
Labor (DOL) as trade-related and who therefore receive Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (TAA) cash payments or would qualify for such payments but for their 
receipt of unemployment insurance (UI); 
• Certain adults aged 55 through 64 who are paid by the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC), which assists retirees from companies that have suffered 
severe financial reversals and so no longer pay promised defined benefit pensions; 
• Adults aged 50 through 64 who receive Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance 
(ATAA) payments because they suffered trade-related job loss and then shifted to a 
new line of work for lower pay; and 
• Dependents of individuals in the three previous categories. 
 
Individuals must also meet other criteria for eligibility, including absence of health 
coverage through Medicare, Medicaid, or employer-based plans (either as a worker or 
dependent) for which the firm pays 50 percent or more of premiums. 
 
Health coverage. HCTCs pay 65 percent of premiums for qualified health plans, which 
fall into two categories: 
 
• State-qualified coverage, which is established by state action (through arrangements 
with an insurer or certain other methods) and which must meet the consumer 
protection requirements described below; and 
• Automatically qualified plans, which are available for HCTC use throughout the 
country (without any required action by state government) and which include: (a) 
COBRA plans offered by former employers; and (b) nongroup coverage in which 
the HCTC beneficiary was enrolled during at least the final 30 days before job loss 
or other qualifying event. 
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Consumer protection requirements. For individuals with at least three months of 
continuous coverage immediately before enrolling in an HCTC plan, without any gap in 
coverage of 63 days or more, state-qualified insurers must guarantee issue and may not 
exclude coverage of preexisting conditions. 
 
Modes of obtaining HCTC. An eligible individual may either claim the HCTC on 
annual tax returns (for reimbursement of insurance premiums paid during the year) or 
have the HCTC paid in advance to the insurer, each month, as premiums are due. 
 
HCTC-related grants to states. These grants, made by DOL and the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), fall into two categories: CMS grants to support 
the establishment and operation of high-risk insurance pools; and National Emergency 
Grants (NEGs) from DOL, which include funding for infrastructure development and 
certain transitional state costs associated with HCTCs. 
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APPENDIX B. ENROLLMENT INTO ADVANCE PAYMENT 
 
While each state tailors the process in accord with its own infrastructure, and the 
national program makes adjustments on an ongoing basis with the goal of improving 
outcomes for beneficiaries, taxpayers, and health plans, enrollment into HCTC payment 
generally includes the following steps: 
 
1) Each State Workforce Agency (for TAA and ATAA beneficiaries) and the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (for its beneficiaries) send the HCTC program lists 
of individuals who may qualify for HCTC. Transmitted electronically, such lists 
are provided daily by SWAs and monthly by PBGC. 
2) The HCTC program mails HCTC Program Kits to each individual listed by the 
PBGC or an SWA as potentially eligible. These kits contain detailed explanations 
of eligibility, qualified coverage, application procedures for HCTCs, and related 
topics. They are available in English and Spanish. 
3) The individual enrolls in qualified health coverage. Unless the potential beneficiary 
lives in a state offering so-called “bridge” or “gap-filler” assistance, he or she must 
pay each month’s premium in full, pending completion of the HCTC registration 
process and the start of advance payment. If the individual turns out to be eligible 
for HCTCs, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reimburses such full-premium 
payments at the end of the year, after the individual files annual income tax forms. 
4) The health plan sends an invoice to the individual showing the full premium 
amount. (The plan can continue sending these full, premium invoices even after 
advance payments begin and the consumer makes 35 percent premium payments 
to the HCTC program, rather than pay full premiums to the plan.) 
5) The individual contacts the HCTC call center to enroll in advance payment, while 
mailing the health plan’s invoice to the HCTC program. The HCTC program 
then uses that invoice to confirm enrollment in qualified coverage and to 
determine the proper dollar amount of the credit and the regular, monthly due 
date for payment to the plan. 
6) The HCTC program determines whether the individual is eligible and, if so, 
registers him or her for advance payment. 
7) For each month of advance payment, the following process applies: 
a) Precisely 27 days before the plan needs to receive its full premium payment, 
the HCTC program bills the individual for his or her 35 percent premium 
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share. The consumer’s payment is due at the HCTC program 21 days after 
the bill is mailed. 
b) If the HCTC program receives the full 35 percent payment by that date, the 
IRS provides a 65 percent advance credit. The HCTC program then combines 
that credit with the beneficiary’s payment, sending the full premium payment 
electronically to the health plan. 
c) If the beneficiary pays less than the full 35 percent amount, the HCTC 
program combines that payment with a proportional matching credit from the 
IRS, forwards the combined payment to the health plan, and reminds the 
beneficiary of the additional amount that must be paid to the plan to retain 
coverage. The plan is then responsible for collecting such additional amounts. 
d) If no payment is received from the beneficiary by the due date, the HCTC 
program sends the consumer a notice stating that HCTC neither received a 
payment from the consumer nor made a payment to the health plan on the 
consumer’s behalf—and that to maintain coverage the consumer must pay the 
full premium amount to the plan. As long as it continues to receive eligibility 
records from PBGC or an SWA, HCTC continues sending advance-payment 
invoices to the consumer requesting 35 percent of the next month’s full 
premium amount. It is up to the individual and the plan to work out issues 
regarding past amounts due and whether coverage continues. Eligible 
individuals who are enrolled in qualified plans and who make premium 
payments that are not covered by advance payment may use their annual tax 
returns to claim HCTC reimbursement for such payments. 
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